![]() A weaker commitment from Washington towards European security could be seen by potential adversaries as an opportunity to take aggressive actions against Europe without suffering the consequences of a US response. This variable could be negatively impacted by political transformations – mainly the development of isolationist policies which would further question the value of collective defense and US extended deterrence. These four sentences are akin to variables whose values are susceptible to evolve, positively or negatively.įirst Variable: the strategic coupling of US and European security interests. The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies’ separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries. NATO's nuclear deterrence posture also relies on United States' nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and the capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. The 2018 NATO Summit Declaration contains something of a formula which synthesizes the role of nuclear deterrence in European security: Four Variables of the European Deterrence Equation Although the answer can only be complex, this paper will focus on the role of nuclear deterrence in European security, and examine different options that Europeans ought to consider. In this environment, European and North American Allies must decide how they should best adapt their posture to maintain their level of security. This is best illustrated by the Europeans’ vivid concerns about Washington’s stance towards arms control, including major arrangements which have proved to be crucial components of strategic stability in Europe – such as the New START treaty, due to expire on February 5, 2021, or the Open Skies Treaty, which Washington will withdraw from in November 2020. More broadly, the end of the “arms control era” would significantly degrade the security environment of the Allies. However, Allies may continue to consider appropriate measures to maintain the credibility of NATO’s posture – such as reinforcing its conventional forces, enhancing the survivability of its critical infrastructures (most critically those necessary to execute NATO’s nuclear mission), or adapting its missile defense capabilities. NATO has consistently refused to deploy similar capabilities that would mirror Moscow’s violation and bring political tensions to alliance cohesion with little military benefits. If Russia were to massively deploy such systems that could hold at risk the European territory without threatening the US territory, it would represent a significant political and military challenge for the Alliance. ![]() Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty has raised the possibility of a return of land-based intermediate-range missiles in Europe. ![]() Russia’s public opinion seems to echo this assessment: 52% of Russians are concerned about the risk of a nuclear war, with 60% assessing that the United States represents a nuclear threat to Russia, and 15% mentioning other Allies. There is little indication that, at least in the short term, Moscow is likely to alter this strategic course. Russia’s ongoing efforts to develop new nuclear weapon delivery systems could also significantly impact strategic stability and European security. Likewise, the increase in Russian activities in Europe – such as flights of strategic bombers, deployments of submarines – and the much-publicized use of strategic capabilities and modus operandi abroad have clearly been perceived as efforts to demonstrate the credibility of Moscow’s strategic deterrence. ![]() This trend has now reversed, most dramatically following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Eastern Ukraine, as the nuclear shadow loomed backed over Europe. “Reducing the salience of nuclear weapons” became a shared international objective, and thus the role of nuclear deterrence in ensuring the security of European countries and their citizens was significantly diminished. As the Cold War ended, massive reductions in the US and Soviet arsenals (from 70,300 in 1986 to 13,890 in 2019 ) and a new security architecture radically transformed the European security environment. A major direct confrontation between “the West” and “the East” could have very likely resulted in the detonation of nuclear weapons on the continent. Ever since nuclear weapons were developed by the United States and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, Europe has lived under the nuclear shadow.
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